Portfolio 4 Public Argument Draft

How Political Polarization Paralyzes the Federal Government

(And Why it Matters) by Max Kelley

This paragraph is ready to hold stunning creativity, experiences and stories.

Understanding the Problem

Introduction

The gridlock in the Federal Government, describes the current state of high polarity, low productivity, partisan nature of Congress and the other branches. In “Experts See Gridlock, Dysfunction Likely in Incoming Congress,” by Rob Garver, the current political situation and gridlock within the Federal Government is summarized. Garver expresses distaste at the idea of the government’s modus operandi staying inept, “It's an arrangement that seems more suited to partisan trench warfare than legislating, scholars who study Congress told VOA,” (Garver 2022). This excerpt gives a pertinent example: “The entire House must vote on a speaker, and the Republicans will have only a small majority. Several dozen members of the Republican Party's ultra-conservative wing declined to support McCarthy's nomination. Without their votes in the full House, and facing unified Democratic opposition, McCarthy cannot win,” (Garver 2022). Garver’s work effectively conveys the current level of dysfunction in the national government.

The extent of political division is rife within American society, and extends into the United States’ government institutions. In particular, the Federal government and its branches has been immobilized by the resultant shutdowns and legislative deadlock, which paralyzes America from the top down. The observation of how the inaction and shutdowns caused by the gridlock in the federal government as a result of current trends of polarization in America will be addressed through a cause and effect type of claim, in which a major cause (polarized and divided government) will be examined, along with its effects (low productivity, highly partisan politics). A number of sources will be consulted in the pursuit of identifying the cause and effect, which will point to tentative solutions or more problems to be addressed. A countering perspective in favor of divided government will be introduced further into the text.

The History

Historically speaking, there have indeed been other periods of high partisanship and/or a following unproductive government. Sources point this out when analyzing the exigence, along with crucial differences. “History holds, at best, a half lesson here. This current period of partisan stalemate stands out in a few respects when we consider America’s long history with partisan conflict,” (Drutman, 2021). Certain and very relevant divergences include the more rigid and less flexible geographic partisanships across the country, and the nature of partisanship itself is more focused on being different from the other party. As in, ideology is a much more significant and deciding factor in determining cooperation at the government level, as well as animosity. An example of past precedent is, “And in 11 of the last 15 elections (presidential and midterm), at least one institution in Washington (the House, the Senate or the presidency) has changed party hands. This kind of turnover is dangerous because it suggests that the parties are unwilling to work together to find compromise…the last time we saw so much institutional volatility was from 1876 to 1896, when at least one institution changed partisan hands in eight out of 10 elections,” (Drutman, 2021)

Institutional Constraints?

A piece from Dr. Josh Huder of Georgetown directs attention towards byzantine procedural organization and political incentives as crucial in driving Congressional polarization, which he argues is the source of polarization in the federal government and by extension America collectively (Huder). Dr. Huder explains how certain trends like concentrating congressional power into high and few places feeds into government becoming a center of “partisan wars,” as much as “policy wars,” (Huder). The assertion that the structure of government is to blame is alluded to in other sources...

Institutional Constraints Continued

one claiming, “It is this structure [Congressional], we argue, that creates the potential for deadlock given split chambers,” (Bianco; Fix, 2020). Huder’s assignment of responsibility to the legal processes of the American government is a disquieting conclusion, and invites curiosity over how to alleviate or resolve such a dilemma, especially if such a solution may involve major changes to the political system as it currently exists. This would further invite a litany of questions and uproot many facets of the federal government and its function, and not necessarily to its future benefit.

Another example which works indirectly is, “The way forward, initially, is not for either group of Americans to believe that they can persuade the other to want what they want. It is to find things that a significant majority of Americans already want and deliver them. This is not a recipe for partisan advantage, but rather for restoring a level of function to the political system that can be felt in the everyday lives of its citizens,” (Baer, 2020). While morality as a concept is absent from this excerpt, it is indirectly pointed to with urging for constructive things like cooperation, and setting aside separate interests for the greater good. An invisible or hard-to-measure impact resulting from this crisis is the erosion of trust for the national government in the U.S., already existing at a low level.

Institutional Constraints?

The Effects

At a grassroots level, it is important to take stock of the exigence, understand how a standstill in American government is harmful, and how people want different and better things. “But dysfunction in Washington—in particular, the failure of Congress to deliver meaningful legislation that has a positive material impact on most Americans’ lives and lifts their hopes for the future—has created a shared background belief that Americans are destined to battle each other over a shrinking pie,” (Baer, 2020).

Speaking in more concrete terms, legislative deadlock can be destructive to a president’s political agenda and the federal government’s ability to pass laws. There are exceptions to this rule, depending on contextual considerations; a president’s honeymoon period, external events (like 9/11), or majorities in government, but...

Solution: The People?

An interesting conclusion to note is the impact of the public on pushing elected officials toward greater cooperation and productivity (Bianco; Smyth, 2020). As said, the malaise in government is highly visible to the voting public, especially on occasions like government shutdowns. These events were spurred by gridlock surrounding contested legislation and entrenched positions. A scholarly paper analyzing electoral accountability for budget delays in state governments found “...that voters do hold legislators accountable for legislative gridlock to some extent, but only those legislators who belong to the majority party in the state legislature,” (Andersen et al, 2020). This fact translates into reelection rates for tardy incumbents down 2-4 percentage points lower than punctual elected officials (Andersen et al, 2020). While such a finding may appear unimportant, estimates suggest that around a fifth of state legislature elections are so contested that such a variable could be decisive in determining a result (Andersen et al, 2020). Such could be inferred to show that the everyday voting population may be in its range of capability and right to alter or affect the dawdling of congressional officials.

The Effects Continued

...in general polarization in government is a major hindrance to its function, and presidential success (Franklin; Fix, 2016). Divided government caused by political division is detrimental to the president’s ability to effectively lead the country, and congress can do little more than pass “housekeeping legislation,” (Franklin; Fix, 2016). Furthermore, deadlock is unlikely to be broken by presidential leadership, among other proposed solutions like eliminating filibusters or fast-tracking bills (Bianco; Smyth, 2020). This entrenched and static modus operandi effectively renders the government’s function grossly inadequate. As Bianco and Smyth put it, “The problem is not that differences between Democrats and Republicans have grown too large to bridge. Rather, the problem is that these differences currently divide the House and Senate,” (Bianco; Smyth, 2020). This effect on the productivity of the federal government is most concerning, and doubt concerning the viability of overcoming these trends is certainly warranted, for no clear answer presents itself.

An Opposing Perspective

Lastly, she maintains an air of calm while discussing this divisive era, maintaining that “Gridlock isn’t anyone’s first choice---not even Libertarians’...” but “It’s pretty much exactly about 50/50 out there, folks. That’s how our parties are built,” (Mangu-Ward, 2016). Her serenity around the existential issue posed by the impasse of the national government is backed by her cool reasoning that such eras have come and gone before, and in due time something like a political realignment will reset the stage. Mangu-Ward’s points are logical and an interesting counter to the exigence. Her comparison of the spending increases across presidencies was an interesting point to make, and she indeed made good points using sound logic. Her work is an interesting counterweight to the presumption that divided government and partisan deadlock is a bad situation. Its stance on the issue however, is seemingly driven by a Libertarian desire to limit government reach and action. In any case, the points she makes are hard to dismiss, other than returning to Drutman’s article establishing that the gridlock isn’t without historical precedent, but it has never been so critical or acute. Considering the relative damage and other negative effects of the problem, the more hopeful critiques from Mangu-Ward understandably lose their luster.

A broad contradictory opinion to the common wisdom of divided government being a negative can be derived, which contains fair merits. Katherine Mangu-Ward talks about how it lowers spending, tempers extremism (in a sense), and limits the overall powers of government (including the president) to be within a reasonable range. She believes that attaining a “mandate” [clear margin of political control], “…justifies ramming through an ambitious political agenda…But divided government makes it difficult to posture in this particular way, and that’s likely to be a good thing for fans of limited government and fiscal discipline during a Joe Biden administration,” (Mangu-Ward, 2016). Taking spending for example, Mangu-Ward points out that “Single party control typically comes with a big price tag,” and compares the 3% spending increase in the Clinton era (or 10% decrease in the Obama years) to the 10 percent or 24% increase under Trump and Bush (the Younger) respectively (Mangu-Ward, 2016). In the cases of the democratic presidencies, their administrations were plagued with divided government for most of their tenure, while the named Republican leaders presided over eras of unified government (Mangu-Ward, 2016). Other details include court-packing will be nigh impossible, and the separation of powers will protect against transgressions attempted to bypass these roadblocks (Mangu-Ward, 2016).

Closing Out

In summation, the present political situation confronting the federal government of the United States of America is at a deep impasse. In combination with the selected sources, the cause of anguish may appear insurmountable, and it is indeed unprecedented as much as it is similar to previous eras. While it is certainly a reflection of broader socio-political unrest among the general American public, the institutions and procedures in place may play a role as much as lower-level belligerence. Such a degree of divided government and confrontation has far-reaching effects, including sorely limiting any progress in legislation, and it does not appear to be ending soon. Certain solutions are forlorn yet possible, including a major political realignment, or a general grassroots mission to reduce the tension and harken a return to collective cooperation, or at least toleration. Any benefits to the current arrangement are not material enough to warrant a change of heart upon the issue. With any luck, while the foundations of American civilization are seriously threatened, its institutions will endure or adapt accordingly to face the cause, and its implications may slowly be resolved in due time.

Works Cited

1. Baer, Dan, “How to Break Polarizing Gridlock? Push for Big, Popular Change,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 20, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/how-to-break-polarizing-gridlock-push-for-big-popular-change-pub-83291.

2. Drutman, Lee, “How Much Longer Can This Era Of Political GridlockLast?” FiveThirtyEight, ABC News, March 4, 2021. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-much-longer-can-this-era-of-political-gridlock-last/.3. Garver, Rob, “Experts See Gridlock, Dysfunction Likely in Incoming Congress,” VOA News, November 16, 2022.https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-see-gridlock-dysfunction-likely-in-incoming-congress/6838134.html. 4. Huder, Josh. “It’s Congress’s Fault: How Congress Polarizes America.” The Government Affairs Institute, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. [Date not stated]. https://gai.georgetown.edu/its-congresss-fault-how-congress-polarizes-america/.

Closing Out (Final)

Works Cited

4. Bianco, William, and Regina Smyth. “The Bicameral Roots of Congressional Deadlock: Analyzing Divided Government Through the Lens of Majority Rule.” Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell), vol. 101, no. 5, Sept. 2020, pp. 1712–27. EBSCOhost, https://doi-org.ezproxy2.library.colostate.edu/10.1111/ssqu.12811.

Academic Sources:1. Franklin, Daniel Paul, and Michael P. Fix. “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Polarization and Presidential Success in Congress.” Congress & the Presidency, vol. 43, no. 3, Sept. 2016, pp. 377–94. EBSCOhost, https://doi-org.ezproxy2.library.colostate.edu/10.1080/07343469.2016.1206638. [https://web-s-ebscohost-com.ezproxy2.library.colostate.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=88054045-220b-461e-b981-29e3fde7dd8c%40redis] (alternate link).2. Mangu-Ward, Katherine. “Good News about Gridlock.” Reason, vol. 52, no. 8, Jan. 2021, pp. 4–5. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,cpid&custid=s4640792&db=aph&AN=147008086&site=ehost-live. 3. Andersen, Asger Lau, et al. “Irresponsible Parties, Responsible Voters? Legislative Gridlock and Collective Accountability.” PLoS ONE, vol. 15, no. 3, Mar. 2020, pp. 1–19. EBSCOhost, https://doi-org.ezproxy2.library.colostate.edu/10.1371/journal.pone.0229789.